Running the company or asleep at the wheel? The director's duty of care

A couple of weeks ago, I discussed whether it was possible to run a company by consensus. The emphasis was on ‘consensus’. In the last few months, however, we’ve seen more people asking the question we’d like to be able to take as read: whether the directors were actually running the company at all.

The last six months have seen more spectacular company failures than most of us have ever seen before. And let’s be honest: a government bailout is actually a failure - just ask the traditional shareholders in British or American financial institutions or US car makers. Closer to home, we’ve seen a string of failures in New Zealand finance companies. Now the shareholders and investors with some of these companies are looking for their day in court, and perhaps for some vindication, even if they may not get their money back.

First, though, another moment of honesty: it’s not a crime for a company to go broke. It’s just a part of the free enterprise system that companies come and go. Sometimes a company fails because a major supplier or customer goes out of business; sometimes the bad news just becomes overwhelming. The law acknowledges this and directors won’t be legally on the hook.

But where the law does become interested is usually in one of two areas: were the directors asleep at the wheel, or did they continue trading when they should have known the cause was hopeless?

I’d like to think about the former, what we call the director’s ‘duty of care’ (the general legal requirement is to act ‘in good faith’ and ‘with reasonable care, diligence and skill’ in what the director believes to be the best interests of the company). Most directors I work with are very aware of this duty and I suspect that the general level has increased recently.

But there’s still the notable exception - for example most of us can name at least one director who regularly fails to read their board papers before arriving at the meeting (although it’s a while since I’ve seen a director blatantly rip open their courier pack as they sat down). In this case, how can they possibly understand the issues or know what’s going on?

Worse still, and one that gets my blood boiling, is the director who consistently fails to turn up for board meetings: I’m not talking about a director who misses one or two meetings a year - we can all get sick or have to travel overseas - and I’m happy to say that I’ve seen less of it in recent years.

But one notable exception jumps to mind. The pattern is familiar - a last minute phone call just before the meeting starts, to tell us about an unexpected visitor he has to see; or a family member who urgently needs to be taken to hospital. Given the pattern of the last few years, he must have a huge family, or they all have a genetic predisposition to sudden serious illnesses - and, thinking about it, he must be the only family member who can drive too. In a case like his, I’d describe it not so much as reasonable care that's lacking, but a total abrogation of his duty as a director.

While a company is doing well, the absent or ill-prepared director may not seem too much of a problem. But a company is entitled to the benefit of its directors’ collective wisdom. My guess is that, if it goes to court (which will occur only if things have gone horribly sour), the judge is likely to decide that that entitlement was retrospective: in other words the board meetings a director failed to attend in earlier years will count against him or her.

And I haven’t even discussed those directors who turn up for the board meeting, enjoy lunch (in fact are often good company), nod sagely at everything that’s said and never contribute an original thought or worthwhile question of their own...

Ah well, back to that latest courier pack for another evening’s reading. Did I hear someone say, ‘Get a life, Richard’?

Paying dividends - a director's duties

If you've taken any interest in financial markets over the last year (and if you either borrow money or have some to invest, it would be a good idea - especially now - to take an interest), you'll know that a number of finance companies in New Zealand have found themselves in difficulties.

You're also likely to have heard various commentators allocating blame. Some commentators have known what they're talking about, but others we might describe, charitably, as having less than a full understanding.

I thought it might help to explain some of the basic duties of directors in these situations (remembering that I'm a company director, not a lawyer, so I'm drawing any inference as an informed layman, rather than a legal expert), so you'll be in a better position to judge the facts:

1. Dividends

In general terms, dividends are income that shareholders receive as a return on their investment, usually paid from the company's tax-paid profit. Section 52 of the Companies Act says that the Board of directors may authorise the payment of a dividend if it is 'satisfied on reasonable grounds that the company will, immediately after the distribution, satisfy the solvency test' - together with a few other conditions.

So what's the 'solvency test'? For this we look at Section 6: '... A company satisfies the solvency test if -
(a) The company is able to pay its debts as they become due in the normal course of business [my italics]; and
(b) The value of the company's assets is greater than the value of its liabilities.'

My guess would be that finance company deposits which fall due on a particular date would be classed as 'in the normal course of business'. In determining the value of the company's assets, 'the directors must have regard to the most recent financial statements of the company ... and all other circumstances that the directors know or ought to know ...' [again, my italics].

Even allowing for the tidal wave of changes in financial market conditions, and the precipitous decline in reinvestment rates (the amount of deposits that are renewed when they fall due, rather than being repaid to the investor), which has led to the liquidity difficulties of some finance companies, these provisions in the Act should prompt some searching questions of a few people who are known to have been paid large dividends in the not too distant past.

2. Reckless trading

There's another Section (135) in the Act, entitled 'Reckless trading' which may also turn out to be relevant. Under this, a director 'must not agree to the business of the company being carried on in a manner likely to create a substantial risk of serious loss ...' to the people the company owes money to.

The Act provides various defences for people charged under these Sections, so you can expect any legal actions to be lengthy, strongly contested, affairs and, naturally, to be far more complicated than this simple explanation.

But I hope that, after reading this, you will be better able to form your own view of the actions and responsibilities of various parties likely to feature in the news in coming months.